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Africana 
Military Expenditures and Socio-Economic Development in Africa: 
a Summary of Recent Empirical Research 
by Robert E. Looney, Professor, National Securiry Affairs, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California 
Africa's disn;ial economic performance in recent years has spawned a rather 
vigorous debate over where to lay the blame for the continuing crisis.1 The 
United Nations and associated agencies cite factors outside the control of 
individual governments, and stress the detrimental impact of the poor 
condition of the world economy, notably the decline in commodity prices and 
foreign aid. By way of contrast, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund favour the school of thought that lays blame more directly on 
internal policy-making. Here the actions taken by governments to distort, for 
example, exchange rates and agricultural prices, and to expand unprofitable 
state enterprises, are seen as the main reasons for the continent's economic 
decline. 
More recently another potential cause of economic deterioration has been 
receiving considerable attention, namely: excessive military expenditures and 
appropriation of scarce foreign exchange for increased imports of arms. These 
rose faster in Africa than in any other region of the world throughout the 
1970s, as Robin Luckham has noted, and growth stagnated so markedly 
during this period that income per capita in 1983 was estimated to be 4 per cent 
below its 1970 level. While Luckham seems unwilling to link the continent's 
setbacks to militarisation (stressing instead poor allocation of resources in the 
early 1970s, and the world depression in the late 1970s and early 1980s), he 
does note that African economies have performed significantly worse than 
those of other developing countries facing similar external difficulties. 2 
A reluctance to speculate as to the existence ofa strong link between Africa's 
economic malaise and its militarisation is understandable given the political 
sensitivity of the issue. Furthermore, a great deal of controversy exists in the 
empirical literature as to the precise manner in which spending on defence 
affects economic variables. 3 However, recent statistical assessments appear to 
be capable of providing insights into the impact that such spending has on 
African development. 4 
1 The dcba1c is summarised and empirically lcstcd in David Wheeler, 'Sources of Stagnation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa', in World Development (Oxford), 1984, pp. 1-23. 
2 Robin Luckham, 'Militarisalion in Africa', in Stockholm lnternalional Peace Research 
Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament, Sf PR/ rearbook, 1g85 (Stockholm, 1985), pp. 295-328. 
3 Sec, for example, the debate in Armed Forces and Society (Cabin John, Md.) on 'Defense 
Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries' between Peter C. Frederiksen and 
Robert E. Looney, Summer 1983, pp. 633-45, and Winter 1g85, pp. 2g8-301, and Nicole Ball, 
Winier 1985, pp. 291-7. 
~ Cf. Robert E. Looney, 'The Role of Military Expenditures in lh<" AfriC"an ~:rnnomic Crisis', 
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The general purpose of this research note is, therefore, to draw on these 
studies in an attempt to answer the following questions: ( 1) To what extent 
can the poor socio-economic performance of Africa be attributed to military 
expenditures? (2) Which sectors, if any, are the hardest hit? (3) Are some 
countries more likely than others to suffer adverse affects? 
A Framework for Anarysis 
Robert Looney and Peter Frederiksen have found considerable support for 
the proposition that increased military expenditures retard growth in countries 
that are experiencing foreign-exchange constraints, while helping develop-
ment in those that are relatively well endowed with resources. 1 Apparently in 
the latter, the associated positive effects in, for example, health and literacy 
are sufficiently strong to offset the diversion of foreign exchange away from 
productive investment. Clearly, additional spending on defence in most 
African economies, given thoir relatively poor export performance and/ or 
limited access to international capital markets, might be expected to have a 
generally negative impact, but this may differ from country to country, 
depending on the composition of these expenditures. 
African governments that experience relatively severe constraints while 
simultaneously facing high internal and/or external threats will be forced to 
allocate a relatively large proportion of their resources to imported arms and 
equipment, and they will not be in a particularly good position to fully use the 
military as a medium for increasing human capital. However, there is 
considerable evidence that infrastructural and skill spill-overs associated with 
defence spending do exist in Africa. 2 Useful civil projects are often undertaken 
by members of the armed services, and there is reason to believe that these may 
create net positive socio-economic gains for the economy and population at 
large. 3 In sum, two opposing force~ appear to be at work in Africa, the relative 
magnitude of which will undoubtedly determine the impact that spending on 
defence has on the economy. 
Operationally, it is possible to correlate the effects of resource constraints, 
as formulated by Looney and Frederiksen, with the analysis of security by 
Robert Rothstein who, as may be seen from Table 1, has constructed a matrix 
capable of classifying developing countries on the basis of governmental 
Monterey, California, 1987. More general conclusions can be drawn from: Robert E. Looney and 
P. C. Frederiksen, 'Defense Expenditures, External Public Debt, and Growth in Developing 
Countries', in Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), December 1986, pp. 32g-38; Robert E. Looney, 
'Impact of Arms Production on Third World Distribution and Growth', in Economic Development 
and Cultural Change (Chicago), 1988, 'Economic Environments Affecting Third World Arms 
Imports', California Seminar, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 26 February 1988, 'Impact of 
Military Expenditures on Third World Debt', in Canadian Journal of Development Studies (Ottawa), 
1987, pp. 7-26, and 'Conventional Wisdom vs. Empirical Reality: the case of third world defense 
expenditures and arms production', U.S. A.I.D. Workshop on Security and Development in 
Developing Countries, Washington,"D.C., 9 March 1988. 
1 Looney and Frederiksen, 1986, loc. cit. • 
2 Bruce Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa (Boulder, 1984), p. 11. 
3 Cf. H. R. Hestman, 'The Potential Role of the Military in National Development', in 
Militaria (Milan), 1978, pp. 1-11. 
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legitimacy/ effectiveness and degree of internal/ external threats. 1 In general, 
those African regimes with a low legitimacy tend to experience a high level of 
threat, and vice versa. While there are several exceptions (notably Nigeria and 
Tunisia) to this pattern, it was felt that for purposes of further analysis the 
following two-group sample was sufficient: 
1. Non-conflict states, de.fined as those with medium lo high levels of governmental 
effectiveness and/ or low threats, and on this basis Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, 
Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and 
Zimbabwe were so classified. 
2. Conflict states, de.fined as those with low governmental effectiveness, and on this 
basis Angola, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, and Zai're were so classified. 
An examination of the socio-economic and military differences between the 
two categories verifies the general picture sketched above, i.e. that those in the 
first group have consistently superior socio-economic performances in respect 
of a wide variety of indices, while those in the second group have a higher 
military burden if measured as a share ofG.N.P. The external sectors also vary 
considerably: while the conflict states had somewhat better export perform-
ances in the 1960s, their ability to import was significantly below that of the 
non-conflict states from 1970 to 1982, in part because of their relative ability 
to borrow externally, as indicated by both the total volume and servicing of 
debt. 2 
If the conceptual framework outlined above is correct, we should expect to 
find a generally favourable association between military expenditures in the 
non-conflict states and their so-called 'quality of life', economic activity, and 
resources for development, with a reverse relationship in the other states. 
Empirical Results 
In order to overcome the difficulties involved in artificially creating a 
'quality of life' index, an analysis was made of 14 socio-economic indices: life 
expectancy, infant mortality, population per physician and hospital bed, 
availability of sale water; per capita income, supply of proteins and calories, 
expenditure on public health and education; extent of adult literacy, 
percentage of children in school and number per teacher, women in university 
enrolment. 3 The results of' this exercise indicate that all African countries can 
be judged on the basis of their levels of achievement in respect of the following 
1 Robert Rothstein, 'The "Security Dilemma" and the" Poverty Trap" in the Third World', 
Fletcher School and University of London Conference on Third-World Military Expenditures, 
London, March 1986, pp. 27-9. Clearly, variables such as legitimacy and effectiveness are difficult 
lo estimate because they require subjcrtivc judgement by analysts, and the same is true for the 
degree of threat (external or internal) perceived by .ruling elites. 
2 Sec Looney, 'The Role of Military Expenditures in the African Economic Crisis', copies of 
which arc available from the author, if so requested. 
3 The data arc for 198o, taken from Ruth Leger Sivert, World Military and Social Exptndilurts, 
1g83 (Washington, D.C., 1983). The military data used in the regressions are also from this 
source. 
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main developmental phenomena: (i) general human capital, (ii) public 
expenditure per capita, (iii) nutrition, and (iv) education among women. 
The next step was to determine through regression analysis the overall 
impact of military expenditures on these four general measures of the 'quality 
of life', and, interestingly enough, a positive and statistically significant 
relationship only appears to exist in the non-conflict states. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the 'quality of life', even in one of the poorest regions 
of the world, does not inevitably decline with increased military burdens, and, 
in fact, in some environments, particularly those characterised by a high level 
of legitimacy and by low conflict, there seem to be a number of positive 
results. 
We can speculate as to the underlying reasons for these findings. The low-
conflict, high-legitimacy countries may have integrated public health and 
educational facilities into the military, and they may have encouraged soldiers 
in remote or backward regions to act as teachers and animateurs who are 
capable of promoting rural development. There are a number of accounts in 
the literature of this type of dual function of the armed forces: in many areas 
of Africa they may be the most efficient medium through which governments 
can introduce health, education, sanitation, and nutritional programmes. 
However, it would clearly be more of a 'luxury' for the low-legitimacy, high-
conflict states to use their military in this manner, and in any case they may 
be less inclined to introduce improvements in the 'quality of life' for large 
segments of the population. 
If this interpretation is correct, we should expect to find that the conflict 
states are more inclined than the others to reduce their socio-economic 
financial allocations as they increase their spending on defence. To test this 
hypothesis, the latter's share in the central government budget was regressed 
on the share of each of the other major socio-economic categories. 1 The 
following contrast emerged from this analysis: 
1. The non-conflict states have experienced several positive linkages 
between defence and socio-economic expenditures, notable public 
services, education, health, social security, roads, and transportation, 
which in each case showed a high degree of statistical significance. The 
only statistically significant negative 'trade-off' was in respect of 
agriculture. 
2. The conflict states have experienced a few negative linkages between 
defenct· and socio-economic expenditures, notably public and economic 
services, and roads. Other categories, such as education, health, social 
welfare, and agriculture have had a non-statistically significant 
association with defence. 
In short, the results obtained in this analysis of budgetary 'trade-offs' provide 
additional evidence that increased spending on defence tends to improve the 
general 'quality of life' in non-conflict states and to reduce it in others. 
Other insights into the reasons for the differential socio-economic impact of 
military expenditures can be obtained by examining the means through which 
they have been financed. For example, since it is rather unlikely that the 
1 Data arc from the World Bank, World De11tlopmml Report (New York), various issues. 
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governments of the conflict states would be able, due to hesitancy on the part 
of suppliers of external credits, to obtain sufficient loans to finance the 
expanded requirements of the armed services, they would be forced to divert 
resources from other activities. On the other hand, since the governments of 
the non-conflict states are likely to be more credit-worthy, and thus able to 
utilise external loans for their expanded military expenditures, they would not 
need to divert a large volume of resources away from other activities. 
To test this hypothesis, military expenditures were regressed on the gross 
domestic product, external public debt, and debt-service payments. The 
following contrast emerged from this analysis: 
1. The non-conflict states have relied largely on external public debt to 
cover their military requirements. It appears that in order to maintain 
credit-worthiness, they have given a high priority to debt servicing, if 
necessary at the expense of increased spending on the armed forces. 
2. The conflict states have not been able to draw extensively on foreign 
resources to facilitate their military build-ups. They have been forced to 
live largely within their domestic means, with added defence expen-
ditures apparently being made out of cuts in other developments. 
As regards the factors that determine arms imports, are there any 
substantial differences between the conflict and non-conflict states? We might 
expect that the latter might be in a position to postpone new acquisitions 
during periods of foreign-exchange scarcity, whereas the conflict states might 
feel such a pressing need (real or imagined) for new weapons that orders are 
placed quite independently of the overall state of the economy. 
To test this hypothesis, arms imports were regressed on the level of gross 
foreign-exchange reserves of the country (reflecting ability to finance imports) 
and total military expenditures (reflecting need for new weapons). Another 
sharp contrast emerged from this analysis: 
1. The arms imports of the non-conflict states have been closely related (in 
an almost one-to-one pattern) to overall foreign-exchange reserves, 
presumably because they were correspondingly reduced during periods 
of currency scarcity. Because of limited needs their governments have 
had the 'luxury' of being able to postpone arms imports until economic 
conditions were favourable, thereby ensuring that scarce foreign 
exchange was not diverted to unproductive uses. 
2. The arms imports of the conflict states have not been related to their 
ability to pay for them, presumably because they reflected immediate 
needs. Their military build-ups do not appear to have been related to 
favourable economic conditions, with the net result that sacrifices have 
probably been inflicted on the population in order to finance their 
stepped-up levels of spending on the armed forces. 
Conclusions 
Recent empirical research de111onstrates the futility of attempting to 
generalise about the costs of military expenditures in the Third World. 
Clearly, the old guns versus butter dichotomy is not universally valid, and may, 
indeed, be extremely misleading for a fairly large group of countries. In 
addition, our findings tend to confirm the general conclusion derived by 
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Rothstein from a qualitative examination of such expenditures in developing 
countries - i.e. that there is no such thing as 'the' security problem, because 
the types of threats and their intensity, make a difference. 1 More importantly 
in the African context, the level, composition, and ultimate socio-economic 
impact of military expenditures are greatly influenced by internal conditions, 
notable the effectiveness of a government in either meeting or containing the 
demands of citizens, and the degree to which it can count on them to comply 
voluntarily with its policies. 
Finally, the outcome of our analysis represents a direct challenge to what is 
generally called 'structural realism', a doctrine that asserts, inter alia, that the 
distribution of power largely determines what happens in the international 
system irrespective of the nature of the 'actors' involved. :2 The results 
summarised above indicate that quite the opposite is, in fact, the case in 
Africa. 
1 Rothstein, op. cit. 
2 Sec, for example, the arguments presented in A. F. K. Organski and J. Kugler, The War 
ledger (Chicago, 1980). 
